pre-requisite-----------------------------The Instruments of Intergovernmental Relations:

The co-operative government framework described above is what determines the distinctive features of the instruments of IGR and sets them apart from comparative, more conventional conceptions. Accordingly, the emphasis of the Audit has been on identifying the weaknesses of the existing structures, strengthening the mechanisms for intergovernmental co-operation and seeking ways to mediate tensions so as not to impair the integrity of the spheres but to elevate their overall unity. The Audit recognized that reform or regulation in itself might not lead to dramatic improvements in performance as poor IGR co-ordination is frequently a problem of capacity and management rather than a problem of inappropriate intergovernmental relations. The recommendations proposed by the Audit Team were accordingly designed to improve accountability and efficiency and provide an enabling framework for the regulation of IGR ‘in ways that would maintain the balance between an evolutionary system and the need for prescription.’ The recommendations were therefore the product of a careful review of the structures and functions of these instruments and the realities on the ground, as well as the perceptions of the elected and appointed officials interviewed by the Audit Team.

The instruments examined in depth comprised those so far developed in an evolving system of IGR. They are at once the institutions and actors in the system -- assessed according to the efficacy of their interaction between the spheres and within them for planning and integrated development. The instruments included, first, the executive branch of government and second, the legislative, which has its own role of developing co-operation between the national assembly and the provincial legislatures, through the National Council of Provinces. They include:

 the national inclusive fora such as the IGF;

 the recently created national/ provincial forum, the Presidential Co-ordinating Council [PCC]

 the informal national-provincial sectoral fora [in the financial and educational sectors respectively], such as the MINMECs

 the statutory MINMECS, fora formally derived from legislation, e.g. the Budget Council and HEDCOM

 the administrative/ technical forum, FOSAD [the Forum for South African Directors’ General]

 the intersectoral cabinet "cluster committees"

 those at provincial and local government level, such as Organised Local Government and the Provincial Intergovernmental Fora

 those at the legislative level, namely the NCOP and its interaction with the National Assembly and the provincial legislatures.

Where formerly the IGF was seen as the instrument at the apex of the intergovernmental relations system, it was, in the view of the Audit Team, an early instrument of IGR whose structure and functions were mutually incompatible. The Audit examined it closely. Although the restructuring of the presidency has provided the strategic architecture to integrate development planning through its intersectotal cluster committees and cabinet offices, there is still considerable need to develop adequate linkages between these and the IGR instruments for the greater coherence of the system. Similarly the creation in June 1999 of the Department of Provincial and Local Government has enabled the national government to improve its monitoring and oversight capacity and, through the department, provide greater strategic direction for intergovernmental co-operation. As indicated in the Audit, this arrangement was more sustainable than replacing the representation afforded by the IGF with any other forum at the centre of the system. The PCC, for instance, among others, technically assisted by the six inter sectoral committees in the Cabinet Office would therefore jointly have the responsibility of advancing the culture of co-operative governance.

The sectoral structures such as the MINMECs – a layer between the national and provincial governments -- were seen to be at the "coalface" of IGR. The recommendations [referred to below] to enact enabling legislation for their regulation is to provide a framework for their activities without imposing an inflexible regime upon them. Assymetry in the design of regulation was possible so long as it was not inconsistent with the general principles underlying the proposed legislation.